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GHANA AND THE IDEAL OF THE CITIZENSHAREHOLDER: A CORPORATE-LAW
RESPONSE TO THE RESOURCE CURSE
JAMES G. SIMPSON†
ABSTRACT
This Note assesses Ghana’s legal regime for managing revenues
from its newfound petroleum reserves as a means of combatting the
resource curse—the well-documented political and economic
phenomenon wherein resource-rich countries experience greater levels
of corruption and poor governance and weaker democracy and
economic growth than resource-poor nations. The Ghanaian regime
fails to provide systemic protections against the resource curse by (1)
supplying insufficient economic development and poverty relief, (2)
lacking incentives and mechanisms for overseeing and holding
accountable the powers responsible for managing petroleum
revenues, and (3) providing insufficient channels for spreading the
economic benefits of extraction beyond the petroleum sector. This
Note undertakes a comparative study of a representative group of
petroleum revenue-management regimes—those of Alaska, Norway,
Indonesia, and Trinidad and Tobago—in search of an effective
regime that might be transplanted to Ghana. Finding that none of
these regimes are adequately applicable to Ghana’s economic, social,
or political context, this Note goes on to propose a novel regime for
petroleum revenue management in Ghana, drawing on principles of
U.S. corporate law.

INTRODUCTION
Substantial oil reserves were discovered in Ghanaian waters just
west of Cape Three Points in 2007, the culmination of a search that

Copyright © 2016 James G. Simpson.
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. / LL.M. expected 2016; Wake Forest University,
B.A. 2013. I would like to thank Professor Joseph Blocher for his guidance through the research
and writing process and the Duke Law Journal staff for their help in bringing my Note to
publication. I would also like to add a special word of thanks for Professor Laurence R. Helfer,
who has inspired and cultivated much of my interest in international and comparative legal
scholarship.

SIMPSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1282

3/4/2016 8:19 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:1281

1

began in earnest in the 1960s. Named commensurate with the size of
the find, the Jubilee oil field was discovered by a joint venture
2
between the Ghana National Petroleum Company (GNPC), Kosmos
Energy, and Tullow Oil, and was thought to signal Ghana’s “potential
transformation into a dynamic middle-income nation, free to choose
3
its own development path.” This discovery was certainly cause for
jubilation, with estimates that the Jubilee field contains recoverable
reserves of 615 million barrels of crude oil and 769 billion cubic feet
4
5
of natural gas, discovery of twenty-three new oil fields since 2007,
and International Monetary Fund projections that Ghana will bring in
6
around US$20 billion in oil revenues.
In the meantime, the nation and its private-sector partners have
been plowing ahead in developing Ghana’s reserves. Indeed, a
number of events that seemed to threaten the stability of the
relationship between the government and the developers did little to
slow down progress. Not even a dramatic ouster of the New Patriotic
Party (NPP) in the 2008 national elections by the National
Democratic Congress (NDC), nor boundary disputes with the Ivory
Coast could stop the parties from bringing the Jubilee field to
7
production on schedule in December 2010. Nor could a GNPC
official’s apparently baseless allegations that Kosmos violated the

1. Ransford Gyampo, Saving Ghana from Its Oil: A Critical Assessment of Preparations
So Far Made, 4 AFR. RES. REV. 1, 1–2 (2010).
2. The GNPC is a state-owned corporation that currently holds title to Ghana’s petroleum
reserves and represents the government in development projects and negotiations. IAN GARY,
OXFAM AM., GHANA’S BIG TEST: OIL’S CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 38
(2009), http://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/oa3/files/ghanas-big-test.pdf [http://perma.cc/2CZRQ5JY]. The GNPC maintains the government’s financial stake in the projects and serves as a de
facto regulator of the industry through contractual-monitoring rights. Id. The existence of this
de facto regime is largely attributable to the fact that the nation’s petroleum expertise is
concentrated in the GNPC. Id. at 36.
3. William Wallis, Oil: Nation Eager to Remain Master of its Own Destiny, FIN. TIMES
(Dec. 14, 2011, 3:10 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f39dba34-236a-11e1-af98-00144feabdc
0.html#axzz3GoFDXr8E [http://perma.cc/KK4R-VCHU].
4. PUB. INTEREST & ACCOUNTABILITY COMM., REPORT ON MANAGEMENT OF
PETROLEUM REVENUES FOR THE PERIOD 1ST JANUARY 2013 TO 30TH JUNE 2013, at 6,
http://www.piacghana.org/2013PIAC_Semi-Annual_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/4XW8-VKSY]
[hereinafter 2013 SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT].
5. Id. at 25.
6. Dominik Kopiński, Andrzej Polus & Wojciech Tycholiz, Resource Curse or Resource
Disease? Oil in Ghana, 122 AFR. AFF. 583, 594 (2013). The GNPC estimates that the
government revenues will amount to at least 38 percent of gross oil production. Id.
7. Wallis, supra note 3. The ouster of the NPP was of special concern to developers, as
they had very a strong relationship with the party and the president. Id.
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8

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In fact, so eager were the parties to
get the oil and money flowing that production began, and has
continued for several years, without any comprehensive regulation of
petroleum extraction and maintenance. Ghana’s Petroleum
Exploration and Production Law remains a work in progress, though
the government did manage to have the Petroleum Revenue
Management Act (PRMA) in place to at least regulate the flow of
9
revenues from petroleum production. The Ghanaian Ministry of
Energy has also attempted to bring some direction to the exploration
and production process by putting together an Energy Sector Strategy
and Development Plan; however, “so far the results have been, at
best, mixed, as the implementation of the development plans seems to
focus more on economic growth and short-term revenue generation
10
and less on sustainability.” It is within this context that oil
production grew to 99,685 barrels per day by the end of 2013, closing
11
in on the target peak-production level of 120,000 barrels per day.
Amid the jubilation and the rush to create much-needed
revenue, many commentators received the news with trepidation,
12
fearing that the “resource curse” will beset the emerging democracy.
The risk of a resource curse is especially troubling to commentators
because Ghana is widely considered to be a beacon of hope for
13
functional African democracies. The “resource curse”—the well-

8. Tensions were understandably running high after Kosmos had to undertake great
expense to prove to regulators that the allegations were false, which U.S. authorities ultimately
accepted. Henny Sender, Bribery: Lines Less Blurred, FIN. TIMES (July 18, 2011, 4:08 AM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/382eb374-b0a7-11e0-a5a7-00144feab49a.html?siteedition=intl#
axzz3HqVxn5nT [http://perma.cc/N3WY-U7DE].
9. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 591–92.
10. Id. at 590.
11. PUB. INTEREST & ACCOUNTABILITY COMM., REPORT ON MANAGEMENT OF
PETROLEUM REVENUES FOR YEAR 2013, at 14, http://www.piacghana.org/2013
PIACAReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/4KAF-EBJ2] [hereinafter 2013 ANNUAL REPORT].
12. See generally Peter Arthur, Avoiding the Resource Curse in Ghana: Assessing the
Options, in NATURAL RESOURCES AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS: TOWARDS CRITICAL
ENVIRONMENT SECURITY 108, 108–27 (Matthew A. Schnurr & Larry A. Swatuk eds., 2012)
(considering ways to avoid the resource curse for petroleum in Ghana); Clemens Breisinger,
Xinshen Diao, Rainer Schweickert & Manfred Wiebelt, Managing Future Oil Revenues in
Ghana: An Assessment of Alternative Allocation Options, 22 AFR. DEV. REV. 303 (2010) (same);
Gyampo, supra note 1 (same); Todd Moss & Lauren Young, Saving Ghana from Its Oil: The
Case for Direct Cash Contribution (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 186, Oct. 2009),
http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1422981_file_Saving_Ghana_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.
cc/SN9W-GYW5] (same).
13. See, e.g., WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2014, at 96 (2014),
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/files/wjp_rule_of_law_index_2014_report.pdf
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documented phenomenon that “resource-rich developing states are
more prone to bad governance, corruption, and rent-seeking behavior
14
that can lead to a weaker democracy” —is of special concern given
the economic stagnation and civil unrest surrounding nearby Nigeria’s
15
large oil-extraction industry, where the curse has become so severe
as to inspire militant groups to rise up against the Nigerian
16
government in the Niger River Delta. Moreover, Ghana has
additional cause for concern, as the former “Gold Coast” has already
battled a resource curse for much of its history with the gold-mining
17
industry. As such, recommendations have come pouring in from
commentators on how Ghana may avoid a petroleum-based iteration
18
of the resource curse.
This Note evaluates Ghana’s existing legal regime, determines
that Ghana is at risk of succumbing to the resource curse, and offers a
new remedy. Part I explains the resource curse and Ghana’s existing
legal regime for managing petroleum revenues, concluding that the
latter is not well-suited to prevent the former. That determination is
based on three abstract problems found in the current Ghanaian
system: (1) a failure to provide for sufficient economic development
and poverty relief, (2) a lack of incentives and means for overseeing
and holding accountable the powers responsible for managing
petroleum revenue, and (3) an absence of channels through which to

[http://perma.cc/J389-T3R4] (ranking Ghana as the country with the second-best rule of law in
its eighteen-country region); Gyampo, supra note 1, at 2 (“Ghana is recognized as an oasis of
peace in a sub-region bedeviled with several violent conflict [sic] related to elections, natural
resources, like oil, diamond, gold, etc.”); Moss & Young, supra note 12, at 2 (“By most of the
common political and economic measures, Ghana has been highly successful, especially relative
to other developing countries or its own West African neighbors.”); Worldwide Governance
Indicators, THE WORLD BANK, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/databases/rule-of-law
[http://perma.cc/D7RF-YNTZ] (last updated Sept. 27, 2013) (ranking Ghana many percentage
points higher on all of the World Bank’s rule-of-law variables than its regional neighbors).
14. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 584.
15. See generally Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Arvind Subramanian, Addressing the Natural
Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 9804, June 2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9804 [http://perma.cc/X579-DPCZ] (linking
the socioeconomic woes of Nigeria with the resource curse).
16. See Oil Workers Flee Attacks by Militants in Nigeria, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at A13
(“Insurgents, known as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, or MEND,
started a campaign of violence in early 2006 seeking more local control of the impoverished
region’s oil wealth.”); BIG MEN (Rachel Boynton 2014) (interviewing militants actively fighting
the Nigerian central government in the Niger River Delta).
17. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 585.
18. See supra note 12 (recommending how Ghana can best manage its oil revenue to avoid
the resource curse).
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spread the economic benefits of extraction beyond the petroleum
sector. Part II presents a comparative study of alternative legal
regimes for managing petroleum revenues—those of Alaska, Norway,
Indonesia, and Trinidad and Tobago. None of these options provide
an optimal solution for Ghana, but they do suggest two key principles
for combatting the resource curse: (1) any entity controlling
petroleum resources and revenues should be accountable to a
constituency with the means and incentive to check its power, and (2)
this constituency must be able to stay informed through transparent
disclosure of the state of the industry and revenues. Finally, Part III
builds these principles into a proposed legal regime for managing
Ghana’s petroleum revenues.
The proposed regime is based on what this Note terms the ideal
of the citizen-shareholder, by which Ghanaian citizens would be given
a direct stake in the nation’s petroleum profits and governance. This
would essentially involve disaggregating a large part of petroleum
revenues and governance from the existing political regime by vesting
them in GNPC, which will then issue the rights to the revenues and
governance directly to the Ghanaian people in the form of stock.
Though it is not without its difficulties, this proposal would help
facilitate economic development, reduce the risk of an enclave
19
petroleum economy, and provide transparency and oversight by
giving Ghanaian citizens an incentive to ensure proper management
by means of a direct financial stake in the outcome. In doing so, this
ideal of the citizen-shareholder specifically addresses those
weaknesses in the current Ghanaian legal regime that place the
nation at risk of developing a resource-cursed economy and society.
Ghana should therefore leave the property rights in its offshore oil
with the GNPC and relinquish its shares to the Ghanaian citizens.
I. GHANA AND THE RESOURCE CURSE
As massive amounts of money begin to flow into government
20
coffers from the oil business, it is worth asking, what exactly is the

19. An enclave petroleum economy is one in which the production of a nation’s petroleum
resources provides few positive externalities to the economy writ large, thus depriving that
nation’s citizens of many of the benefits of their natural resources. See infra note 24 and
accompanying text.
20. The Ghanaian government reported petroleum revenues totaling US$978,017,692 in
2014. PUB. INTEREST & ACCOUNTABILITY COMM., REPORT ON MANAGEMENT OF
PETROLEUM REVENUES FOR YEAR 2014: ANNUAL REPORT 27–28 (2014), http://
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risk? What is it about money from natural resources that has proven
such a curse for developing nations, especially in Africa? Answering
these questions is key to understanding both potential problems that
might arise as Ghana manages extractive industries and how to
formulate an effective response.
A. Petroleum and the Resource Curse
Much of the literature on the resource curse arises from the
proven, counterintuitive observations that resource-rich economies
tend to be outperformed by resource-poor economies, and that the
abundance of natural resources is negatively correlated with
21
economic growth. The problem is especially exaggerated in oil
22
This phenomenon is explained by two major
economies.
macroeconomic observations. First, natural-resource extraction
23
carries few positive externalities. Indeed, “[e]xtractive industry
investment creates enclave economies where the investments have
24
few linkages to the rest of the economy and few jobs are created.”
Second, the world price volatility associated with natural resources
25
drags economies dependent on them. Therefore, from the outset, it
would seem that an effective response to large-scale natural resource
extraction would require a means of spreading natural-resource
profits to other sectors of the economy to reduce enclaving and
dependence.

piacghana.org/2014PIAC.pdf [http://perma.cc/4BCX-HHEC] [hereinafter 2014 ANNUAL
REPORT]. This is up from US$846,767,184 in 2013. 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 20.
21. See generally Jeffery D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and
Economic Growth (Ctr. for Int’l Dev. & Harvard Ctr. for Int’l Dev. Working Paper, 1997),
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/warner_files/natresf5.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6LZW-4S6B]
(discussing several theories explaining this counter-intuitive result).
22. Id. at 14–15.
23. Id. at 4.
24. GARY, supra note 2, at 12. The extractive industries create enclave economies because
they require little labor from the locality and the local labor that they do require does not result
in significant amounts of skill accumulation by individual employees. Sachs & Warner, supra
note 21, at 4–7. As such, extractive industries do not generate many externalities, and social
wealth does not grow much beyond the return on private investment. Id. This stands in contrast
to manufacturing, which produces social good well beyond the return on private investment by
creating many jobs, which teach skills that increase overall productivity in society. Id. at 5. In
fact, extractive industries tend to push more capital and labor away from the economic sectors
that do create broad positive externalities (manufacturing) and into nontradable sectors
(services), which support the extractive industries but generate little social benefit. Id. at 6.
25. Sachs & Warner, supra note 21, at 9.
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Such
macroeconomic
problems
with
natural-resource
abundance, however, are exacerbated by problems of political
economy. For example, “[w]ith ‘easy’ money rolling in, many
countries often reduce their efforts at non-oil revenue collection.
When this happens, petrodollars replace more stable and sustainable
26
tax revenue streams.” Moreover, there is a widespread perception
that “natural resource abundance inevitably leads to greater
corruption and inefficient bureaucracies; or that high rents distract
governments from investing in the ability to produce growth
27
supporting public goods, such as infrastructure or legal codes.” Such
behavior is compounded by what economists Philip Lane and Aaron
Tornell have termed the “voracity effect,” in which multiple powerful
groups within a resource-rich society clamor to obtain resource rents,
leading to widespread rent-seeking behavior and attendant
28
deadweight economic loss. Additional troubles arise from the
tendency of such governments to waste rents through ill-advised
29
consumption or poor investment. Indeed, the public spending that
such governments do undertake tends to be financed by a “borrowing
spree[] based on their new ‘credit worthiness,’” and ultimately feeds
30
into wasteful patronage systems. Finally, it appears that economic
growth in such nations is further burdened by mismanagement and
31
kleptocratic governments.
As might be expected from the economic stagnation attending
natural-resource abundance, the resource curse also negatively
impacts a democracy’s ability to effectively govern itself in the
32
absence of strong, preexisting governmental institutions. Indeed, an
empirical study by Michael Lewin Ross finds strong statistical
26. GARY, supra note 2, at 11; see also BIG MEN, supra note 16 (filming Norwegian
Minister of Environment Erik Solheim giving a speech to stakeholders in Ghana’s oil business
in which he urged the government not to become lazy when it comes to collecting other sources
of revenue).
27. Sachs & Warner, supra note 21, at 9.
28. Philip R. Lane & Aaron Tornell, Power, Growth, and the Voracity Effect, 1 J. ECON.
GROWTH 213, 239 (1996).
29. Sachs & Warner, supra note 21, at 10.
30. GARY, supra note 2, at 11.
31. See BIG MEN, supra note 16 (documenting widespread and large-scale theft of Nigerian
oil through the process of “bunkering” (stealing oil directly from pipelines) by both criminal
groups and government officials, and through oil-company employees illegally selling
“condensate fuel” (low-grade gasoline) under the table to black-market purchasers).
32. See generally Matthew L. Norman, Note, The Challenges of State Building in Resource
Rich Nations, 10 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 173 (2012) (describing the tendency of
governmental weakness and failure in the presence of abundant natural resources).
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evidence that the presence of oil and other types of mineral wealth
tends to have a strong negative correlation with democratization and
33
a positive association with repression and resistance to democracy.
Much of this problem arises from the fact that leaders of
resource-rich nations have no incentive to develop the sort of strong
institutions that are critical to an effective state, such as those
34
involved in taxation and protecting property rights. In fact, the lack
of effective state institutions can misalign the incentive structures of
government leaders to the extent that “in some instances, a shrewd
leader of a resource-rich nation will deliberately seek to shrink every
other sector of the economy in order to prevent economic change and
the social forces and competitors for power [that] economic change
35
tends to produce.”
The incentives facing leaders of resource-rich nations can often
point directly away from establishing a functioning democracy. What
such leaders truly value—more than governing effectively or
protecting individual liberties—is controlling the state and its
attendant resource revenues: “Access to resource rents may make
control of the state so valuable, and give winners such complete
power to punish losers, that relations between the state and those
36
mobilizing for representation degrade into violence.” In fact, there is
concern that the leaders of resource-rich nations use government
37
proceeds to subsidize potential human-rights abuses. The presence
of natural resources tends to increase the risk of rebellion and civil
war, presumably because a government’s natural-resource wealth
38
provides a tempting target for dissenters. Such violence, however,
33. Michael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, 53 WORLD POL. 325, 356–57 (2001).
34. Norman, supra note 32, at 43–44.
35. Id. at 42.
36. Id. at 45.
37. See IAN GARY & NIKKI REISCH, CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVS. & BANK INFO. CTR.,
CHAD’S OIL: MIRACLE OR MIRAGE?: FOLLOWING THE MONEY IN AFRICA’S NEWEST PETROSTATE 42 (2005), http://www.internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Chads-Oil-Miracleor-Mirage.pdf [http://perma.cc/5TPF-ZQJ7] (describing how President Idriss Déby of Chad
used oil proceeds to purchase weapons); Annalisa M. Leibold, Note, Aligning Incentives for
Development: The World Bank and the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 167,
168 (2011) (same).
38. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, On Economic Causes of Civil War, 50 OXFORD ECON.
PAPERS 563, 571 (1998). But see Benjamin Smith, Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the
Developing World, 1960–1999, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 232, 232 (arguing that “oil wealth is robustly
associated with more durable regimes and significantly related to lower levels of protest and
civil war”). However, where there are exceptionally large amounts of natural resources, the
incidence of civil war tends to decrease, presumably due to the strength of the government
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may be caused by other factors given the abject failure of most
resource-rich nations to give dissenting voices an outlet through
39
democratic institutions.
Even when peaceful elections do occur, incumbents enjoy the
massive advantage of being able to access the state’s vast resources
and pour them into patronage systems and public welfare in order to
40
ensure their popularity and ultimate victory. Moreover, when
incumbents are at risk of losing their powerful stake they are
incentivized to further loot the state while they have access to its
41
42
coffers, as happened in Nigeria, leaving less and less money for
running an effective democratic state.
Combatting the roots of the resource curse in political economy
requires serious managerial oversight. Indeed, given the strong
incentive for personal or factional aggrandizement in a resource-rich
political economy, there likely needs to be a powerful, peaceful,
institutionalized force to keep incumbents in check, the most obvious
43
being democracy. At its most basic level, this suggests a need for a
means of popular control, a reason for the exercise of popular
control, and a means of informing popular control. A strategy for
combatting the resource curse in Ghana will need to address these
44
issues, as well as those macroeconomic considerations noted above.
B. Ghana’s Efforts to Avoid the Resource Curse
Ghana is a nation of 25 million people with a gross domestic
45
product of US$90.41 billion, or approximately US$3,500 per capita,
which translates into less than two dollars a day for around 80 percent
funded by such wealth. Collier & Hoeffler, supra, at 571. Such nations include those with strong
preexisting government institutions or the powerful autocracies of the Middle East. See id. at
573 (listing the surveyed nations that did and did not experience civil war between 1960 and
1992).
39. See generally Ross, supra note 33 (arguing that the increased risk of civil war in
resource-rich countries is due to rebels’ desire to capture a rich government treasury).
40. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 28, 31 and accompanying text.
42. See BIG MEN, supra note 16 (“Between 1960 and 1999, Nigerian officials stole or
wasted more than $440 billion. The country is consistently ranked one of the most corrupt in the
world.”).
43. Norman, supra note 32, at 7.
44. Namely, the lack of positive externalities of natural-resource extraction and price
volatility of the resulting commodities. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
45. The World Factbook: Ghana, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gh.html
[https://perma.cc/75S3-TQ7C]
(last
updated June 22, 2014) [hereinafter Ghana Factbook].
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46

of Ghanaians. Its economy is based upon commodity exports,
primarily gold, cocoa, and now oil, and is seen by some as a relatively
47
strong economy, and by others as one with serious cause for
48
concern. The nation has a winner-take-all two-party political system
49
characterized by government overspending and pork-barrel politics.
This system nevertheless remains strong due to a small political class
with a robust network of informal relationships that helps stabilize
50
the system and widespread civic awareness of political issues.
Indeed, the strength of Ghana’s civil society is primarily attributable
to a large and active community of Nongovernmental Organizations
(NGOs) that work to monitor the government and lend it their
51
expertise. Ghana is widely seen as a model for sub-Saharan African
democracy despite poverty, reliance on natural resources, and
52
contentious politics. Indeed, the Ghanaian government remained
stable throughout the highly contentious 2008 election of President
John Atta Mills and the constitutional succession of John Dramani
53
Mahama upon Mills’s death in 2012. With a stable government and
serious poverty issues, it is little wonder that Ghana has been in a
54
hurry to exploit its petroleum wealth. At the same time, however,
any legal regime for managing that wealth should carefully consider
Ghana’s strengths, like its democracy, and its weaknesses, like its
undiversified economy and serious poverty.
Although Ghana will reap massive windfalls from its oil reserves,
55
the nation has only a twenty- to thirty-year production period, which
means that the government will need to carefully manage its oil
revenues in order to share that prosperity with future generations and

46. GARY, supra note 2, at 2.
47. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 588–89.
48. See generally FELIX OPPONG, DILEK AYKUT & GREGORY SMITH, THE WORLD BANK,
GHANA ECONOMIC UPDATE: OCTOBER 2014, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/10/27/000333037_20141027091747/Rendered/PDF/918090
WP0Ghana043B00PUBLIC000web30.pdf [http://perma.cc/H3GE-BFVR] (explaining how the
macroeconomic conditions have continued to deteriorate).
49. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 587–88.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 593 (describing the strong role that NGOs play in Ghanaian civil society).
52. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
53. Adam Nossiter, John Atta Mills, President of Ghana, Dies at 68, N.Y. TIMES (July 24,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/world/africa/john-atta-mills-ghanas-president-dies68.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/47C5-HNF9].
54. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
55. GARY, supra note 2, at 3.
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ensure its long-term success. Accordingly, the Ghanaian government
56
prioritized the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, which will
help allocate the funds coming in through royalties, equity holdings,
57
corporate income taxes, payroll taxes, duties, and the like. All such
58
revenues are managed by the Bank of Ghana, which is responsible
for allocating them according to a statutory formula between the
government’s general account in the Annual Budget Funding
Amount (ABFA), the Ghana Stabilization Fund, and the Ghana
59
Heritage Fund. The ABFA is made up of oil revenues that go
60
directly into the national budget and can be spent for any purpose
61
the legislature wishes. “The government deliberately set up two
separate funds to insulate long-term savings from short-term
economic pressures: while the Stabilization Fund is structured to
safeguard the budget against year-to-year fluctuation [in oil
prices] . . . the Heritage Fund is intended to protect the livelihood of
62
future generations . . . .” The Heritage Fund operates as a typical
sovereign-wealth fund, investing excess government revenues to
produce economic returns that will support future generations. The
Stabilization Fund “can be drawn down in the event of a sudden
shortfall in petroleum revenues (but not one that stems from poor
revenue collection) to provide financing for any ongoing projects and
63
ensure budget sustainability.”
Consistent with Ghana’s thriving democratic character, the
PRMA sets out clear allocation rules for petroleum revenue as
between the ABFA, Stabilization Fund, and Heritage Fund. When
setting the nation’s annual budget, the government must project its oil
56. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 591–92.
57. Id. at 594.
58. Petroleum Revenue Management Act § 2(1) (Act No. 815/2011) (Ghana),
http://www.mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/reports/Petroleum_Revenue_Management_Act_%2
02011.pdf [http://perma.cc/737A-Y7J4]. The Bank of Ghana is a semi-independent government
agency whose board of directors and governors are appointed by the President of Ghana in
consultation with the Council of State. About the Bank, BANK OF GHANA (Feb. 7, 2011, 3:46
PM), http://www.bog.gov.gh/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=130%3Abankof-ghana&catid=64&Itemid=137 [https://perma.cc/SV7Y-TSQC]. The Bank is primarily
responsible for controlling the Ghanaian currency, regulating the financial sector, and serving as
banker and financial advisor to the Ghanaian government. Id.
59. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 599–600. This system drew inspiration from the
examples of Norway and Trinidad and Tobago. See infra Parts II.B, II.D.
60. Id. at 600.
61. Id. at 600 n.63.
62. Id. at 600.
63. Id.
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revenues for the coming year—the Benchmark Revenue—70 percent
64
of which then constitutes the ABFA. At the end of the year, all
actual excess revenues are then divided between the Stabilization
65
Fund and Heritage Fund at 70 percent and 30 percent respectively.
The Ghana Revenue Authority oversees and regulates the allocation
66
of these funds. Moreover, the government has set up the Public
Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) to monitor and
evaluate the government’s petroleum-revenue collection and
management, and to ensure that the public is well informed of how
67
the government is doing so.
C. The Persistent Risk
The existing framework looks attractive but does not fully
address the risks of the resource curse present in Ghana and leaves
the nation vulnerable in certain respects. The PRMA does not do
enough to pull money out of the oil industry to combat the
macroeconomic aspect of the resource curse or, most importantly, to
68
combat poverty—the very reason for the initial jubilation.
Additionally, the oversight and governance regimes do not appear to
be functioning properly and threaten to exacerbate the dangers of the
resource curse rooted in political economy. Indeed, the outstanding
democratic progress made by Ghanaians needs to be further
complemented by a petroleum revenue-management regime that will
curb the risk of poverty, mismanagement, and macroeconomic
weakness.
1. Revenue Projection and Maintenance. Although the petroleum
revenue-allocation process may seem relatively straightforward and
transparent, major questions and risks surrounding this process still
persist. One element that remains unclear is the process by which
Ghana reaches its annual oil-price assumption in calculating the
69
Benchmark Revenue (and, thus, the ABFA). That assumption is the

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 594–95.
Id. at 596–97.
See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
GARY, supra note 2, at 45; see also PUB. INTEREST & ACCOUNTABILITY COMM.,
REPORT ON MANAGEMENT OF PETROLEUM REVENUES FOR YEAR 2012: ANNUAL REPORT, at
vi (2012), http://www.piacghana.org/2012%20PIAC%20Annual%20Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/
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key variable that could allow the Ghanaian government to seriously
under- or overfund itself. The government has thus far not fared very
well in projecting oil revenues that are reasonably close to the actual
70
revenues. The risks associated with overfunding are thus particularly
acute given that the national budget lacks the capacity to absorb
windfalls: the budget could handle an additional US$250–300 million,
71
“but ‘nothing like $400 million to $500 million.’” That lack of
absorptive capacity is one strong reason why oil funds outside of the
72
government budget were needed.
Ghana must carefully manage its petroleum revenues to ensure
that it is able to achieve serious development on a long-term basis and
to overcome widespread poverty. Under the current system, this
specifically requires government planners to avoid the problems of
73
absorptive capacity by projecting petroleum revenues accurately and
74
to ensure that the Heritage Fund can produce sustainable returns.
Satisfying both of these requirements is, however, extremely difficult
HRB9-5QAM] [hereinafter 2012 ANNUAL REPORT] (recommending that the Ministry of
Finance disclose such assumptions).
70. See 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 27–28 (underestimating revenues); 2013
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 16 (underestimating revenues); 2012 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 69, at 13 (overestimating revenues); PUB. INTEREST & ACCOUNTABILITY COMM.,
REPORT ON PETROLEUM REVENUE MANAGEMENT FOR 2011: ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2011),
http://www.piacghana.org/PIACREPORT2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/3PGJ-B67W] [hereinafter
2011 ANNUAL REPORT] (overestimating revenues).
71. GARY, supra note 2, at 45. When a government lacks absorptive capacity, it often
means that a government lacks enough economically viable projects to fund, or it lacks the
staffing (both in quantity and quality) adequate to manage such a project. ROMEO A. REYES,
ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY FOR FOREIGN AID 35–36 (1990), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/
PNABE619.pdf [http://perma.cc/P9ZQ-9W4T]. Even if the government might be physically
capable of spending its money, absorptive capacity includes an assessment of the government’s
ability to oversee such an expenditure so that the funds are not wasted or siphoned off through
graft. See id. at 37–38 (“To ensure financial accountability in the use of foreign aid, the auditing
office would need to regulate its use by prescribing certain accounting and auditing rules and
regulations.”).
72. See GARY, supra note 2, at 45 (“[I]t would appear that significant sums would have to
be put into an oil savings or stabilization fund to avoid absorptive capacity problems.”).
73. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. If a government is unable to absorb money
into its budget, it effectively means that the government does not have the ability to spend or
invest it, which prevents its citizens from realizing any immediate benefit from it. Cf. GARY,
supra note 2, at 45 (noting that Gabon, a longtime producer, has high spending on social
services in comparison with other African countries).
74. See Sony Kapoor, Investing for the Future: Good for Norway – Good for Development
20 (Nor. Church Aid, Discussion Paper 01, 2013), http://www.re-define.org/sites/default/files/
sites/default/files/images/ReDefineReportonNorwaySWF.pdf
[http://perma.cc/M74R-3RYD]
(providing that sovereign-wealth funds need to generate sustainable returns at or above the
level budgeted by the government).
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and has proved problematic for Ghana so far. The Ghanaian
government has had serious trouble accurately projecting its
petroleum revenues, which prevents optimal utilization of those
funds. The projections’ best showing was in 2012, but this was still off
by GHS 250 million (approximately US$78 million) of the actual
amount of petroleum revenues, which resulted in an approximately 15
75
percent shortfall for the ABFA. Figure 1 below demonstrates the
historical difficulty the Ghanaian government has had in projecting its
petroleum revenues over the first four years of production by
comparing projected and actual petroleum revenues. The PIAC has
consistently criticized the government in its annual reports for failing
76
to accurately and transparently project the Benchmark Revenue.
With the continuing extreme volatility in oil prices baffling budget
77
projectors across the globe, the Ghanaian government—as any
government would—will likely continue to struggle to project its
budget accurately. Indeed, when projecting its revenue for 2015, the
government assumed a crude oil price of approximately US$99 per
78
barrel. Prices have since been in free fall: the price of crude sat
around US$48 per barrel on September 11, 2015, and Goldman Sachs
predicts that it could drop as low as US$20 per barrel in the near
79
future. Although the Ghanaian Minister of Finance has taken the
commendable step of revising the budget projections down since his

75. See 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 23 (underestimating petroleum revenues
by approximately GHS 453 million); 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 13, 16
(overestimating petroleum revenues by approximately GHS 260 million, resulting in a roughly
GHS 100 million shortfall of the GHS 614 million ABFA); 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
70, at 11 (overestimating petroleum revenues by approximately GHS 583 million).
76. 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 32; 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at
xiii; 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69, at vi; 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at viii.
77. See Isabella Cota, Eric Martin & Carlos Manuel Rodriguez, Mexico Dodged Oil-Price
Rout After Big Banks Provided Hedges, BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 11, 2015, 2:39 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-11/mexico-beat-oil-price-rout-as-bankerstook-other-side-of-hedge [http://perma.cc/85R3-72TB] (describing how Mexico, a petroleumrevenue-dependent state, used derivative contracts to avoid some of the crash in oil prices
affecting government revenue); Chris Giles, Oil Rout Would Have Wrecked an Independent
Scotland’s Finances, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d97d49ce-877d11e4-bc7c-00144feabdc0.html [http://perma.cc/QV35-KZWP] (noting that the uncertainty and
volatility in oil prices makes it incredibly difficult to project government oil revenues, and this
difficulty imposes significant risks on economies like Scotland that rely heavily on oil revenues).
78. 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 55.
79. Oil Prices “Could Sink to Near $20,” Warns Goldman, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015),
http://www.ft.com/fastft/390471/oil-prices-could-sink-near-20-warns-goldman [https://perma.cc/
8PD5-T4PB].
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80

initial projections, this nevertheless highlights the struggle that any
government faces when trying to forecast commodities revenues. The
notoriously perilous process of projecting oil revenues makes it
difficult for Ghana to manage this income stream in an optimally
efficient manner, which, coupled with a lack of transparency, suggests
81
that Ghana may have problems combating the resource curse. These
difficulties unfortunately hint at the very struggle that often
characterizes the resource curse: managing and investing natural82
resource rents.
Figure 1. Projected v. Actual Ghanaian Petroleum Revenue

83
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Although it may seem that the current regime at least hedged the
risk that it might not be able to efficiently spend and invest its budget
through the use of the petroleum funds, those funds have not
84
generated steady returns. The returns are so low, in fact, that it will
be virtually impossible for them sustain future generations without

80. 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 56.
81. Governments in resource-rich countries need to have a very effective revenueprojection system, not only in order to efficiently allocate resources, but also to avoid an all-out
breakdown in fiscal responsibility. GARY, supra note 2, at 11 (“With booms often comes
dramatically increased, and unsustainable, public spending based on unrealistic revenue
projections.”).
82. See supra notes 27, 29 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 70.
84. See infra Figures 2–3.
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drawing down the principal, which, naturally, defeats the funds’ longterm viability. As Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate, although the book
value of both funds has been growing at a frantic rate, on average
more than 99 percent of this growth has been from contributions of
new oil revenue and less than 1 percent from return on investment.
85
With a nominal annualized rate of return of only 1 percent in 2014,
the Ghanaian funds likely rank among the worst performing
sovereign-wealth funds in the world. Norway’s fund was recently
criticized for bringing in a nominal annualized rate of return of 5.25
86
percent. Successful funds have generated significantly higher
annualized rates of return than Ghana’s: Abu Dhabi’s fund has
returned 7.7 percent, China’s 5.02 percent, and one of Singapore’s 4
87
88
percent. As the PIAC has noted, Ghana’s petroleum funds are not
earning sufficient returns to provide a viable source of income for
future generations. Ghana’s existing system for managing petroleum
revenue does not fit the nation’s need for sustainable development
and poverty reduction, as it makes it difficult both to project revenue
for purposes of efficient spending and to earn meaningful returns on
its fund investments.

85. See infra Figures 2–3.
86. Kapoor, supra note 74, at 29.
87. Id. at 35. This is the Singapore Foreign Exchange Reserve Fund, which is among the
more conservatively managed funds and still manages to greatly outpace the Ghanaian fund. Id.
88. See 2013 SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 4 (noting that, because a lack of high
returns has caused concern, “[t]he Government must release the Policy and Guidelines to assist
the Fund Managers to better manage these funds as required by the [Petroleum of Revenue
Management Act of 2011]”); Press Release, Pub. Interest and Accountability Comm., Statement
by the Public Interest & Accountability Committee (PIAC) on the Current Debate on the
Ghana Heritage Fund, at 2 (May 7, 2014), http://www.piacghana.org/pstatement.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3MPC-GWWD] [hereinafter PIAC May 2014 Press Release] (arguing that the
Heritage Fund should invest in “low-interest earning but safe investments for the long-term
instead of high-yielding, gilt-edged securities which invariably are volatile”). Although
protecting principal is undoubtedly important, the Heritage Fund cannot ignore yields
altogether if it wishes to achieve sustainable status. The fund must at least outpace inflation to
an extent that allows Ghanaians the ability to eventually withdraw from the fund without
depleting its principal balance.
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Figure 3. Ghana Heritage Fund (US$)
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89. 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 50; 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at
48; 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 22–23; 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at
29. Note that the decline in book value of the Stabilization Fund is due to government
withdrawals during 2014. See supra note 28 and accompanying text; infra notes 91–93 and
accompanying text.
90. 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 50; 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at
48; 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 23; 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 29.
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2. Fund Protection. In addition to engendering economic
inefficiencies, the current system of allocating petroleum revenues
between the government budget and the petroleum funds poses
problems of political economy indicative of the resource curse.
Consistent with Ghana’s historical tendencies toward overspending
and pork-barrel politics, it appears that the petroleum funds are
tempting politicians who are hungry to access the hundreds of
millions of dollars locked within them. For example, four years into
the Heritage Fund’s existence the General Secretary of the ruling
91
NDC party, Johnson Nketia, has already proposed drawing it down
notwithstanding the fact that the law creating it specifically allows for
the government to access the funds only “[w]ithin one year after
92
petroleum reserves are depleted.” It appears that some Ghanaian
politicians want to flout the avowed object of the Heritage Fund: to
“provide an endowment to support the development for future
93
generations when the petroleum reserves have been depleted.”
Though the PIAC has publically condemned proposals to
94
prematurely deplete the funds, the risk of such depletion remains a
source of concern given the possibility of the resource curse and
95
symptoms like the voracity effect.
Despite the PIAC’s protests, parts of the Ghanaian government
have already demonstrated a willingness to undermine the long-term
viability of the fund system. In May 2014, the Minister of Finance
blatantly violated the PRMA by retroactively capping the
Stabilization Fund at US$250 million and withdrawing the excess of
96
approximately US$176 million. Of that money, US$16 million was
placed in a “Contingency Fund” and the remaining US$159 million

91. Asiedu

Nketia: Heritage Fund Makes No Sense, Let’s ‘Chop’ It Now!,
(May 2, 2014), http://exposeghana.com/2014/05/asiedu-nketia-heritagefund-makes-no-sense-lets-chop-it-now [http://perma.cc/92GB-4EZM]; see also PIAC May 2014
Press Release, supra note 88, at 1 (rejecting such a proposal as contrary to Sections 13 and 20 of
the Petroleum Revenue Management Act).
92. Petroleum Revenue Management Act § 2(1) (Act No. 815/2011) (Ghana), http://www.
mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/reports/Petroleum_Revenue_Management_Act_%202011.pdf
[http://perma.cc/737A-Y7J4].
93. Id. § 10(2)(a).
94. PIAC May 2014 Press Release, supra note 88, at 1.
95. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
96. Press Release, Pub. Interest & Accountability Comm., Position of the Public Interest
and Accountability Committee (PIAC) on Placement of Cap by the Minister of Finance on the
Ghana Stabilisation Fund (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.piacghana.org/PressStatementII.pdf
[http://perma.cc/M6Z8-9BWY].
EXPOSEGHANA.COM
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97

was used to repay some of Ghana’s debts. The law does grant the
Minister of Finance the authority to cap the Stabilization Fund, but
the statute’s text does not suggest that such authority applies
98
retroactively.
Moreover, although the Minister might have
prospectively kept excess petroleum revenues from being deposited
into the Stabilization Fund, once money is actually in the Fund it may
only be transferred out “for the purpose of alleviating shortfalls in
99
actual petroleum revenue.” Thus, Ghana’s petroleum funds might
seem like mechanisms for protecting some of the Ghanaian people’s
oil wealth from the reach of the government in order to avoid the
corruption, mismanagement, and abuse of power that erode
democracy in resource-cursed countries, but the funds’ legal
framework does not adequately alleviate these concerns. Examples
like these indicate a lack of fiscal discipline, which could enable
corrupt behavior. Indeed, some politicians may “see these funds as a
panacea or substitute for strong public financial management systems
100
and policy frameworks.”
Concerns about fiscal discipline also extend to the ABFA. To the
government’s credit, the PIAC provides a significant amount of
101
transparency in how the ABFA is allocated in the budget. However,
transparency as to what sector of the government or what projects the
money is going to does not necessarily reduce the risk of corruption,
and the benefits of transparency are undermined by a lack of properly
incentivized oversight. For example, “[t]he Serious Fraud Office has
been underutilized and under-resourced and currently needs the
102
approval of the attorney general to approve investigative cases.”
The Nigerian example shows that lack of strict oversight can lead to
corruption of state officials, especially those involved in the

97. Id.
98. The relevant portion of the law reads, “The accumulated resources of the Ghana
Stabilisation Fund shall not exceed an amount recommended by the Minister and approved by
Parliament . . . .” Petroleum Revenue Management Act § 23(3) (Act No. 815/2011) (Ghana),
http://www.mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/reports/Petroleum_Revenue_Management_Act_%2
02011.pdf [http://perma.cc/2RQS-448J].
99. Id. § 12(5).
100. See GARY, supra note 2, at 46 (describing attitudes of governments around the world
toward natural-resource funds, including budget-stabilization funds).
101. See 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 28–36 (providing data detailing the
allocation and utilization of ABFA funds); 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 18–20
(same); 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 21–26 (same).
102. GARY, supra note 2, at 46.
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103

petroleum industry itself. Ghana would thus likely benefit greatly
from a regime that incentivizes oversight.
3. Enclave Economies.
The current petroleum revenuemanagement regime does not adequately address the resource curse’s
macroeconomic roots. Politicians are free to spend the ABFA
however they like and are not committed to reducing the risk of
developing an enclave oil economy, nor do they have the incentives to
do so. From 2011 to 2013, the government allocated 10 percent of the
ABFA to building petroleum production capacity, 20 percent to
expenditures and amortization of the loans it took out to finance
petroleum production, and 63 percent to roads and other
104
105
infrastructure, much of which went to energy infrastructure, and
much of which presumably went to the petroleum industry in some
106
form or another. Although it certainly makes sense that the
petroleum industry will require extra capital as production ramps up,
it should not come at the expense of spreading government money
around to encourage growth in different sectors of the economy and
to prevent the development of an enclave petroleum economy. The
risks of an enclave economy are especially pronounced in Ghana,
where an economy already over-reliant on commodity exports like
gold and cocoa subjects the country to price fluctuations in the world
107
market and makes it difficult to plan for development. The problem
is that government officials lack incentives to redirect ABFA money
to other sectors of the economy. It makes logical sense for a
politician, who is presumably not going to be in office much longer
than the twenty- to thirty-year production window, to focus entirely
on building up Ghana’s capacity to make short-term gains. Doing so
would maximize the amount of money she can put to use while she is
still in office. Such concerns about incentives are well founded, as
108
current policy appears to favor just such short-term gains.

103. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
104. 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 29.
105. Id. at 32–35.
106. Although it is difficult to track the dollars down with any degree of scientific exactitude
through the publically available reports, it seems quite logical that much of the infrastructural
investments would be to facilitate petroleum production, such as the provision of electricity,
which is necessary for many elements of the productions process.
107. GARY, supra note 2, at 2.
108. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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In fact, the legal regime that Ghana has adopted to manage its
petroleum revenues carries too many perverse incentives that
encourage the sort of behavior characteristic of the resource curse.
Though it serves a legitimate purpose by insulating the government
budget from price fluctuations in the global oil market, the
Stabilization Fund reduces incentives to manage the budget
responsibly. After all, this safety net, which apparently can be drawn
109
down by the Minister of Finance whenever he wishes, insulates
politicians from immediate budget constraints that might otherwise
prompt prudence. This problem is compounded by the fact that the
government can obtain loans by collateralizing future oil
110
111
production. Furthermore, despite claims that it will not happen,
politicians have a strong incentive to spend ABFA money on
patronage systems in order to maintain power, which is particularly
troubling given the nation’s tendencies toward pork-barrel politics.
112
All of this foreshadows behavior indicative of the resource curse.
It should be emphasized, however, that Ghana still has a strong,
young democratic tradition, which helps to combat the resource
113
curse. Ghana has undertaken to provide transparency in the
industry—that much of the data used in this Part was sourced from
publicly available government reports speaks to the success of such
114
transparency efforts,
as does the statutory declaration of
transparency as a fundamental principle of petroleum-revenue
115
management. However, as alluded to above, the persistent difficulty
is that the present legal regime does not adequately incentivize open
and accountable governance going forward. As is common in
109. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text (discussing proposed withdrawals from
the Heritage Fund).
110. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 592.
111. Id. at 587–88.
112. See Gyampo, supra note 1, at 7 (“[W]hoever won the election was going to have an
‘ATM machine on his veranda . . . .’” (citation omitted)).
113. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
114. However, this data is largely limited to financial reports and excludes operational
information that is of great public importance, such as environmental impact reports,
information about how the petroleum is marketed (to ensure Ghana is receiving top dollar), or
how the assumed oil price is calculated for budgetary purposes. See generally 2013 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 11 (reporting primarily on the budgeting and allocation of petroleum
funds); 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69 (same); 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70
(same).
115. Petroleum Revenue Management Act § 49 (Act 815/2011) (Ghana), http://www.
mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/reports/Petroleum_Revenue_Management_Act_%202011.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2RQS-448J].
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resource-cursed countries, when extractive industries pay into the
government, wealth and power are increasingly concentrated in the
116
government’s hands. In a nation like Ghana whose democratic
117
strength is due largely to its network of civil-society organizations,
high levels of transparency are needed to allow these organizations to
effectively check the government and counteract a concentration of
118
power and wealth. Although part of this can be remedied by making
additional disclosures—such as of the signed contracts with private
119
companies like Kosmos, Tullow, or Anadarko —this does not
remedy the structural problem of incentives. Providing optimal levels
of transparency is neither convenient nor desirable for Ghanaian
leaders under the current system.
Indeed, perverse incentives are already eroding transparency.
For example, the Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
was created to encourage transparency in the sector but actually
120
provides little meaningful information and accountability.
Moreover, it is “difficult for citizens to hold government accountable
for its management of the public’s money” and “[o]pportunities for
121
citizen participation in budget debates could be increased.” Input of
civil-society organizations has also been largely circumscribed on
122
matters of policy, and the Ghanaian government already has a poor
123
track record of allowing such organizations access to information,
124
which does not bode well for Ghanaian democracy. Thus, Ghana’s
misaligned incentives cast considerable doubt on the democratic
efficacy of its legal regime for managing its petroleum resources and
facilitate the undisciplined, pork-barrel spending that may stop

116. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
117. See Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 591 (highlighting the role of civil-service
organizations in creating oil policies).
118. See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 12, at 122 (“[T]he absence of political transparency and
accountability, coupled with the high incidence of corruption, have all combined to undermine
the ability of the various levels of government in a country like Nigeria from putting in place
policies and programmes that would contribute to the overall socio-economic development of
the oil producing areas.”).
119. GARY, supra note 2, at 30–31.
120. See id. at 15 (noting some of the Initiative’s weaknesses, including its voluntary nature
and that it does not cover disclosure of contracts).
121. Id. at 45.
122. Gyampo, supra note 1, at 6.
123. GARY, supra note 2, at 48.
124. See Gyampo, supra note 1, at 7 (noting a threat to Ghanaian democracy from this
trend).
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Ghana from addressing the macroeconomic roots of the resource
curse.
The current legal regime that Ghana has adopted for managing
its petroleum revenues simply does not do enough to alleviate the
risks of the resource curse. The structure of the Ghanaian regime
facilitates rather than frustrates the macroeconomic and political
economy roots of the resource curse. The Ghanaian system suffers
from three main problems: (1) it fails to provide for sufficient
economic development and poverty relief, (2) it does not adequately
incentivize or facilitate strict oversight and control of the powers
responsible for management of petroleum revenue, and (3) it does
not provide an appropriate channel for passing the economic benefits
of petroleum extraction to the rest of the economy. Though there are
signs of hope in the Ghanaian system given its growing democratic
strength, much of the problem is attributable to the government’s
attempt to institute a type of system that, although similar to systems
effective in Norway and countries with similar levels of democratic
accountability, is not feasible in Ghana. A strategy for preempting the
resource curse in Ghana must take account of the country’s
limitations and strengths and focus on aligning incentives with good
governance and social benefit from petroleum extraction.
II. ALTERNATIVE LEGAL REGIMES
Given that the current Ghanaian legal regime for managing
petroleum wealth is insufficient to protect against the resource curse,
this Part examines and compares systems from Alaska, Norway,
Indonesia, and Trinidad and Tobago, which Ghana might consider
implementing. None of these systems can be transplanted in its
entirety to Ghana, as a solution must be tailored to the nation’s
political and socioeconomic realities. But the comparison nonetheless
helps illuminate certain principles that a Ghanaian legal regime
should embrace in order to defeat the resource curse: (1) the regime
should include a constituency with the means and incentives to
oversee and to keep in check whatever institution is empowered to
manage petroleum revenues, and (2) it should also entail a high level
of transparency to allow that constituency to effectively oversee and
restrain the managerial institution.

SIMPSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1304

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/4/2016 8:19 AM

[Vol. 65:1281

A. Alaska
Beginning in 1967, the state of Alaska discovered substantial oil
reserves beneath state-owned land, which gave rise to hefty rents for
125
the government. The Alaska legislature “decided that a portion of
income from oil reserves and other natural resources should be
invested to maximize long-term revenue from the state’s natural
resources, and in 1976 the Alaska Constitution was amended to
126
establish the Alaska Permanent Fund.”
The constitutional
amendment requires that at least 25 percent of all state revenues from
mineral extraction be invested in the Alaskan Permanent Fund
127
(APF). The APF is then managed by a state-owned corporation, the
128
Alaskan Permanent Fund Corporation. The Corporation must
make income-producing investments according to the “prudentinvestor rule,” which requires it to use the care of an ordinarily
129
prudent institutional investor. This rule is especially important to
the Alaskan legal regime because, since 1980, qualified Alaskan
130
residents have been entitled to receive dividends from the fund. In
131
2014, Alaskans received a dividend of US$1,884. The amounts have
132
fluctuated, but the dividend has not fallen below US$800 since 1988.
The APF, especially the dividend program, appears to have been
remarkably successful at combating the resource curse because it
reduces the concentration of oil wealth in the hands of the state and
gives Alaskans an incentive to ensure proper management of the
133
Fund. Indeed, one of the motivating factors for enacting the
dividend program in the first place was the common perception that
134
politicians had wasted large amounts of oil revenue. The Alaskan
government’s mismanagement was facilitated by a lack of serious

125. Harrod v. Alaska Dep’t of Revenue, 255 P.3d 991, 994 (Alaska 2011).
126. Id. (footnote omitted).
127. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 15.
128. About the Fund, ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., http://www.apfc.org/home/
Content/aboutFund/aboutPermFund.cfm [http://perma.cc/6S8S-F6MX].
129. ALASKA STAT. § 37.13.120 (2012).
130. Harrod, 255 P.3d at 994.
131. Annual Dividend Payouts, ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., http://www.apfc.org/
home/Content/dividend/dividendamounts.cfm [http://perma.cc/76WM-BXG7].
132. Id.
133. See Moss & Young, supra note 12, at 9 (noting that with the dividends, Alaska
artificially created an empowered constituency interested in “responsible resource
management”).
134. Id.
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135

political accountability for its use of oil revenues. The dividend
program solved this problem by “creating a political constituency for
136
the Permanent Fund that did not previously exist.” In fact, some
scholars have argued that receipt of Permanent Fund Dividends is
137
premised on membership in the Alaskan political community. The
Alaskan system of oil-revenue management has been so successful
that commentators have suggested that Ghana adopt a modified
version of it through direct cash distribution of petroleum revenues,
which would result in a payout of approximately US$50 per capita per
138
annum.
Although the proposition of a population-wide revenue-sharing
scheme in Ghana is a potentially attractive solution to the resource
139
curse (as will be addressed later), it is not altogether clear that an
Alaskan-style system will fit the Ghanaian context given the lack of a
highly developed, longstanding democratic infrastructure. Of course,
Ghana has made wonderful progress in developing democratic
140
institutions;
it would be naive, however, to expect nascent
institutions to respond positively to large influxes of cash. In Alaska,
simply providing dividends was enough to establish a constituency
with a vested interest in exacting proper management from a
government that was a part of one of the world’s most stable
141
democracies. The reform was thus operating from a much higher
accountability and rule-of-law baseline than exists in Ghana. Indeed,
even if the proposal were passed notwithstanding the retrenched
142
interests of political factions seeking to retain a hold on oil wealth,
the example of the PIAC suggests that government administration of
such a program would be significantly hampered by institutional
143
weaknesses. Simply put, Ghanaian citizens are unlikely to exact
sufficient accountability from an Alaskan-style fund managed

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend and Membership
in the State’s Political Community, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 79, 81 (2012) (arguing that dividend
receipt is related to membership in the state’s political community).
138. Moss & Young, supra note 12, at 13–16.
139. See infra Part III.
140. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
141. See Norman, supra note 32, at 176 (listing the United States among stable
democracies).
142. Moss & Young, supra note 12, at 18.
143. See supra notes 85–97 and accompanying text.
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144

through their elected representatives. As such, a direct-distribution
system based on the Alaskan model would not likely be of significant
aid in helping Ghana to avoid the resource curse.
B. Norway
When Norway discovered large offshore oil reserves in the
Norwegian Continental Shelf in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
government established a national petroleum company, Statoil, to
145
develop the nation’s offshore reserves. Since 1985, Statoil has
shared custodianship of the state’s large participating equity interest
in petroleum ventures with the State’s Direct Financial Interest, a
146
government entity.
In addition, the Norwegian government
established a separate regulatory authority, the Norwegian Petroleum
Directory, which was seen as crucial to avoid confounding the state’s
147
commercial and regulatory interests. In 2001, the government gave
up part of its stake in Statoil when the company went public, but it
still maintains large participating interests in the oil reserves and the
148
company.
All the government’s oil revenues are deposited in the
Norwegian Government Pension Fund, the nation’s massive
sovereign-wealth fund, which is insulated from political interference
and managed by independent government financial institutions such
149
as the central bank. Though the Norwegian government is allowed
150
to set the Fund’s investment policy, the Fund is structurally
insulated by a ban on collateralizing oil revenues to increase
151
government borrowing capacity and by a requirement that the Fund

144. See supra notes 91–103 and accompanying text.
145. Mike Olsen, Note, The Future of National Oil Companies in Russia & How They May
Improve Their Global Competitiveness, 35 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 617, 634–35 (2013) (“Norway
eventually chose [to create a state-owned company to represent its interests in petroleum]
largely due to the fear that a private company would be in control of the nation’s resources and
its interests would primarily promote international capital.”).
146. Id. at 637.
147. Id. at 636.
148. Id. at 639–41.
149. See NOR. MINISTRY OF FIN., THE MANAGEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT PENSION
FUND IN 2013, at 6 (2014), https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/5434cb3d2ff04441
a21a2c9b1d55ea06/en-gb/pdfs/stm201320140019000engpdfs.pdf [http://perma.cc/G4VN-64ZQ]
(outlining the basic goals, structure, and strategy of the fund).
150. Id.
151. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 592.
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152

cannot have any pension liabilities associated with it. Instead, the
government is allowed to budget for an average annualized real
return of 4 percent to be spent as it will in order to share the benefits
153
of oil production with future generations. Though it has had some
154
hiccups along the way, the fund is now earning huge returns and is
the world’s largest sovereign-wealth fund with holdings of US$820
155
billion.
The Norwegian centralized-fund system for managing oil
revenues has been remarkably successful, due primarily to the
Norwegian
government’s
overwhelming
sense
of
public
accountability. It provides an unparalleled level of transparency in the
investment and use of its oil revenues and invests with a focus on
social policy both in Norway and abroad, which has made the Fund
156
the envy of the world and the enemy of the resource curse. Indeed,
political commitment to the notion of the fund as a communal
resource for the good of the nation is reinforced by the nation’s
extensive managerial capacity, contributing to an environment of
stability, growth, and prosperity—the antithesis of the resource curse:
“The high level of transparency in political and bureaucratic
processes reinforces the general trust in the integrity of politicians as
well as in the professional skills of the civil service—few Norwegians
would question the government’s ability to manage Norway’s oil rents
157
in an honest and efficient way.”
Indeed, in a speech to stakeholders in Ghanaian petroleum, the
Norwegian Minister of Environment, Erik Solheim, made it
abundantly clear that his country’s oil revenue-management regime is
driven by such a spirit of accountability: “Our philosophy in Norway
152. About the Fund, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., http://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/aboutthe-fund [http://perma.cc/CP2G-EL8M] (last updated Aug. 21, 2014).
153. Kapoor, supra note 74, at 25.
154. See id. at 33 (criticizing Norway’s fund management for failing to produce a real rate of
return above 4 percent before 2013); Alan Cowell, Is Norway’s Oil Pool Deep Enough? Aging
Baby Boomers Loom Over a Fund Financed by Petroleum, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at C1, C3
(describing political pushes to draw down the principal of the fund to finance various endeavors
such as entrepreneurship or infrastructure and education investment).
155. Stanley Reed, Rise in Stocks Leads to surge in Norway’s Oil Fund Profit, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 1, 2014, at B6.
156. See, e.g., Benn Eifert, Alan Gelb & Nils Borje Tallroth, Managing Oil Wealth, 40 FIN. &
DEV. 40, 43 (2003) (arguing that Norway’s Fund’s transparency and social awareness make it the
gold standard for sovereign-wealth funds); Delia Velculescu, Norway’s Oil Fund Shows the Way
for Wealth Funds, IMF SURV. MAG. (July 9, 2008), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
survey/so/2008/POL070908A.htm [http://perma.cc/MAR6-WWS3] (same).
157. Eifert et al., supra note 156, at 43.
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is that the oil revenue belongs to the people of Norway. No one
158
else.” Given this egalitarian and clearly successful model, it is no
wonder that Ghana has actively sought to model its legal regime for
159
management of oil revenues on that of Norway.
Although Ghanaian officials agree with Solheim’s egalitarian
notion that “the oil revenue of Ghana belongs pure and simple to the
160
people of Ghana,” Ghana lacks the institutional capacity to
implement such an ideal by means of the Norwegian model. As
discussed at length in Part I, the Ghanaian attempt at instituting a
Norwegian-style legal regime for managing oil revenues is foundering
and has placed Ghana at risk of succumbing to the resource curse.
The Ghanaian government has not placed sufficient trust in the
161
Norwegian notion that radical transparency, strict adherence to the
162
and full democratic accountability in the
letter of the law,
management of oil revenues culminate to promote a stable and
163
sustainable oil economy. Indeed, the Ghanaian government was
164
unable to resist the urge to collateralize its petroleum proceeds,
with the resulting debt creating a threat of funds being used to
mitigate increased budget deficits. Nor has the Bank of Ghana been
165
able to catalyze the returns needed to make its funds sustainable.
Therefore, though Ghana can learn a great deal about ideals for
governing petroleum revenues from Norway, an outright Norwegian
system is simply not feasible for Ghana.
C. Indonesia
Unlike Alaska and Norway, Indonesia has been producing oil for
well over one hundred years under Dutch, Japanese, and, as of
166
independence in 1949, home rule. Given the colonial context,
Indonesia did not have the opportunity to develop any sort of legal
158. BIG MEN, supra note 16.
159. Gyampo, supra note 1, at 8. As will be addressed infra Part II.D, Ghana has also drawn
inspiration from Trinidad and Tobago.
160. BIG MEN, supra note 16.
161. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 109–24 and accompanying text.
164. Kopiński et al., supra note 6, at 592.
165. See supra Figures 1–3; see also supra notes 70–82 and accompanying text (describing
the Ghanaian government’s struggle to accurately predict revenues and to create returns on its
petroleum-fund investments).
166. Shannon Pallone, Indonesia’s Oil Crisis: How Indonesia Became a Net Oil Importer, 10
J. INT’L POL. SOLUTIONS 1, 2 (2009).
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regime for petroleum-revenue management until more than sixty
167
years after reserves were discovered. The government began by
carrying a simple 50-percent participating equity interest in the
reserves developed by private companies, but, in 1968, the
government formed a national oil company, Pertamina, which has
since dominated the Indonesian oil market and brought in substantial
168
revenues. With Pertamina in control of the oil industry and with
virtually no transparency, Indonesian officials, by means of the
nation’s oil revenues, developed an extensive patronage system with
alarming levels of corruption throughout the second half of the
169
twentieth century. The corruption subsumed what commentators
have referred to as the policies of a “reformist autocracy,” in which
oil revenues were earlier spent to bring about measurable social
170
gain. The Indonesian technocrats ran the economy and used oil
revenues to stabilize the food supply, reform the financial sector,
invest in economic infrastructure, and diversify the economy,
171
particularly through agriculture. Indonesia has since stepped up its
corruption investigation and enforcement in an effort to realize the
substantial technocratic expertise that initially allowed the nation to
172
flourish.
Indonesia has also undertaken serious structural reforms of its oil
revenue-management regime to improve its allocation of those
revenues to their most beneficial uses. Beginning in the 1990s,
Indonesia began implementing a large-scale natural resource
revenue-sharing plan among the various levels of government and
geographic regions, giving proportionately higher allocations to
173
petroleum producing areas. This de jure asymmetric program is
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2–3.
170. Eifert et al., supra note 156, at 43.
171. Id.
172. Pallone, supra note 166, at 4.
173. Cut Dian Agustina, Ehtisham Ahmad, Dhanie Nugroho & Herbert Siagian, Political
Economy of Natural Resource Sharing in Indonesia 2 (London Sch. of Econ. & Political Sci.,
Asia Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 55, 2012), http://www.lse.ac.uk/asiaresearchcentre/
_files/arcwp55-agustinaahmadnugrohosiagian.pdf [http://perma.cc/37UR-NG5Q]. The levels of
government are central, provincial, and district (local). Id. at 5. The central government still
receives the lion’s share of natural-resource revenues; however, the decentralizing program has
given a substantial amount to the district governments as well. Id. At a geographic level, oilproducing regions receive 40 percent of all subnationally allocated oil revenues in proportion to
their production levels, and another 40 percent is divided pro rata among all of the
nonproducing regions. Id. at 14.
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designed to combat the resource curse in two substantial ways. The
first is reducing the risk of inter-regional conflict (and, hence,
increasing political and economic stability) in a geographically and
ethnically diverse nation by allowing different regions to see more of
their perceived fair share of revenues generated through extraction
174
on their land. The second is that the revenue sharing increases
government accountability by giving all constituents an incentive to
175
ensure that the revenues are used most efficiently and are tailored
176
to the needs of specific communities via the local governments. It is
precisely the close relationship between the citizenry and their local
governments that should boost awareness of and interest in the use of
177
oil revenues.
Although it remains too early to fully calculate the efficacy of
Indonesia oil revenue-management reforms, especially in regard to
178
efforts to combat corruption, the structural reforms at least initially
appear to be performing well. The district-level allocation system
179
seems to be reducing inter-regional tensions, and the accountability
180
function seems to be doing well at least on a macro level. However,
as regards individual officials, accountability does not appear to have
181
as much traction as the country is still mired in corruption. Of
course, patronage networks will take time to be dismantled given
their long-standing status in Indonesia, so there may yet be hope that
corruption will be eradicated, and an already-strong Indonesian
182
economy will be able to truly soar and live up to its vast potential.

174. See id. at 6–7 (arguing that the asymmetric plan was instituted in direct response to calls
for secession over the central government’s perceived theft of regional resources).
175. See id. at 33 (discussing how increasing oil-revenue expenditure at the local level
facilitates accountability for the use of oil revenues by local officials). Presumably, this logic
extends up the chain of government as well. Just as it gives the citizenry an incentive to monitor
local officials, so too would it provide an incentive for citizens to monitor revenue allocations
made by the central government. Incentives for monitoring up the chain would also likely
extend to the different levels of government, providing checks and balances to manage oil
revenues.
176. Id. at 29–30.
177. Id.
178. See Pallone, supra note 166, at 4 (discussing the difficulties faced by increased efforts at
combating corruption).
179. Agustina et al., supra note 173, at 6.
180. See WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 13, at 102 (ranking Indonesia highly in
constraints of government and government transparency).
181. See id. (ranking Indonesia in the bottom quartile for corruption).
182. See THE WORLD BANK, INDONESIA ECONOMIC QUARTERLY: SLOWER GROWTH;
HIGH RISKS, at i–iv (Dec. 2013), http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/
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Given the strong technocratic base in Indonesia, that seems a real
183
possibility.
Although the Indonesian model—at least theoretically—has
potential to provide a low-cost system for implementing structural
protections from the resource curse, it will likely not be feasible or
even desirable in Ghana. The Indonesian system addresses problems
that Ghana does not have given the lack of local political
infrastructure and of much inter-regional conflict. As a matter of fact,
Ghana is a completely centralized state with no regional
184
185
governments. Indeed, regional and local government is simply
administered by agents of the central government at the pleasure of
186
the Ghanaian president. Thus, Ghana fundamentally lacks the sort
of popular local and intergovernmental accountability that makes the
Indonesian system attractive as a method of combating the resource
curse. Such intergovernmental accountability could not realistically
be implemented without a wholesale constitutional restructuring of
the Ghanaian government. Moreover, a large part of what makes the
Indonesian model a potentially effective means of combatting the
resource curse is its ability to minimize inter-regional conflict—a
manifest symptom of the resource curse in Indonesia which is not
present in Ghana and that thus makes the Indonesian solution less
relevant. Therefore, like the Alaskan and Norwegian models, the
Indonesian model is not likely to offer much guidance to Ghana as it
seeks to fight off the resource curse.
D. Trinidad and Tobago
Trinidad and Tobago was allegedly, in 1857, the site of the
world’s first productive oil well while under British colonial rule;
unlike Indonesia, however, petroleum production did not become a

EAP/Indonesia/IEQ-Dec13-ENGLISH.pdf [http://perma.cc/2RA8-ETN3] (arguing that
Indonesia should adopt policies to retain its high level of economic growth in order to reach its
potential as a powerhouse economy in Southeast Asia).
183. Eifert et al., supra note 156, at 43 (describing Indonesia’s history of leveraging
bureaucratic expertise to spend oil revenue efficiently and effectively).
184. See Victor Essien, UPDATE: Researching Ghanaian Law, GLOBALEX (Jan. 2012),
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Ghana1.htm [http://perma.cc/JFL2-X5KD] (discussing
Ghana’s general legal framework).
185. FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG GHANA, THE STRUCTURE OF THE GHANAIAN STATE 6
(2011), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ghana/10504.pdf [http://perma.cc/MB7H-YTXW].
186. See id. at 8–9.
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major part of its economy until its independence in the 1960s.
Independence put the country in much greater control of its
petroleum resources, and, hence, its petroleum revenue, which
188
amounted to half of all government revenues as of 2008. The
country uses multiple state-owned corporations, partnered with
private investors, to develop its petroleum resources and to bring in
189
the government’s nontax revenue. The Trinidadian government has
long had a policy of plowing its petroleum revenues back into the
economy, primarily to fuel additional exploration, production, and
190
expansion of natural-gas exploitation. Though this government-led
investment model remains in place, the government began
implementing a fund-based system in 1999, first establishing the
Interim Revenue Stabilization Fund and then, in 2007, the Heritage
and Stabilization Fund—a fund designed to accomplish both national
191
savings and budget stabilization. The Heritage and Stabilization
Fund has no mandatory funding amounts, only catching those
revenues that happen to be in excess of the amount projected by the
192
government for budgetary purposes. The fund is managed by the
Trinidadian central bank and the legislature is allowed to withdraw its
funds if annual petroleum revenue falls below 10 percent of the
193
194
budgeted projections. Whether in the Fund or in the expenditure

187. Justine Ram, Distribution and Sustainable Development in a Natural Resource-Based
Economy 12–13 (July, 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London Sch. of Econ. & Political Sci.),
http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/469/1/Ram_Distribution%20and%20Sustainable%20Development%20i
n%20a%20Natural%20Resource-Based%20Economy.pdf [http://perma.cc/7ZS9-G49L].
188. Id. at 13.
189. Id.
190. See Ronald Sanders, Trinidad and Tobago: Time to Ease off the Gas, GLOBAL: THE
INT’L BRIEFING, http://www.global-briefing.org/2013/01/time-to-ease-off-the-gas [http://perma.
cc/5Z3J-6GA9] (arguing that the Trinidadian government should abandon its practice of
expanding its petroleum sector and instead invest petroleum rents in other sectors to diversify
the economy).
191. Gregory McGuire, Heritage and Stabilisation Fund: Did We Get It Right?, in A REPORT
OF THE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT NETWORK (SDNTT) 88, 93
(Nov. 2009), http://thecropperfoundation.org/sdn/documents/Final_Guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/
G6JH-SXJJ].
192. Id. at 94. To be precise, the government must deposit all revenues exceeding 10 percent
of the projected levels and all amounts below 10 percent may be deposited at the discretion of
the minister of finance. Id.
193. Id. at 95.
194. See id. (“[T]he rules provide for an annual audit by the Auditor General, as well as the
submission of quarterly and annual financial statements to the Minister.”).
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195

of petroleum revenues in the national budget, the government puts
a strong de jure emphasis on transparency, requiring broad
disclosures on finances as well as the financial interests of any
196
government officials in the petroleum industry.
As the similar names of its funds suggests, Ghana has also drawn
inspiration from Trinidad and Tobago’s regime for petroleum197
revenue management, but such reliance is likely misguided. Much of
the Trinidadian success is premised on the expertise cultivated over
decades of projecting and exploiting petroleum revenues, which is as
of yet absent in Ghana. Moreover, the Trinidadian system is designed
198
for a much smaller nation with substantially larger hydrocarbon
199
200
reserves and substantially more per capita wealth, which naturally
suggests that it was designed with different priorities and to meet
201
different objectives than might be best for Ghana. As such, Ghana
likely should not seek any further inspiration from the Trinidadian
system.
Although none of these systems provide an off-the-shelf solution
to Ghana’s risks of the resource curse due to the different conditions
prevailing in these countries, they do provide important lessons that
inform the following proposal. Effective administration of petroleum
195. See Gregory McGuire, Dennis Pantin, Dale James & Navin Seeterram, A Guide for
Monitoring the Management of Oil and Gas Resources in Trinidad and Tobago, in A REPORT OF
THE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT NETWORK (SDNTT), supra note
191, at 2, 62 (summarizing the laws mandating transparency in Trinidad and Tobago’s oilrevenue scheme).
196. Trinidad and Tobago: Resource Governance Index, NAT. RESOURCE GOVERNANCE
INST., http://www.resourcegovernance.org/our-work/country/trinidad-and-tobago [http://perma.
cc/4TCT-S3LH].
197. Gyampo, supra note 1, at 8.
198. Trinidad and Tobago is a nation of approximately 1.2 million people. The World
Factbook: Trinidad & Tobago, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/td.html [http://perma.cc/TV3H-SKFZ] (last updated June
20, 2014) [hereinafter T&T Factbook]. Ghana has a population almost twenty-one times larger,
at 25 million. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
199. Trinidad and Tobago has reserves of approximately 728 million barrels of crude oil and
13.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Trinidad & Tobago, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=TTO [http://perma.cc/4TXY-D2H2] (last
updated Oct., 2014). Ghana, on the other hand, has reserves of 615 million barrels of crude oil
and only 769 billion cubic feet of natural gas. 2013 SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 6.
200. Trinidad and Tobago’s GDP per capita is approximately US$20,000, T&T Factbook,
supra note 198, whereas Ghana’s is US$3,500, Ghana Factbook, supra note 45.
201. For example, as one might expect of a wealthier nation, there is less need for the fund
to serve as an independent generator of national wealth to support the public welfare. Indeed, it
has been persuasively argued that the Trinidadian fund system subordinates the national-wealth
objective to the budget-stabilization objective. McGuire, supra note 191, at 96–98.
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revenues requires serious levels of transparency and monitoring in
order to ensure that the funds are managed and spent appropriately
and to avoid corruption. Indeed, to achieve such diligent monitoring
typically requires either an institution with the kind of technocratic
expertise and public charge of honesty as seen in Norway or Trinidad
and Tobago, or parties with a clear and direct stake in the best
administration of such funds, as in Alaska and Indonesia. Whether
framed as public trust or public suspicion, effectively combatting the
resource curse is premised on public confidence that those who
manage their resources can and will be accountable for their success
or failure.
III. THE IDEAL OF THE CITIZEN-SHAREHOLDER
What Ghana needs, therefore, is a system that gives Ghanaians
the ability and incentive to keep account of the nation’s oil revenues
and ensure their use for public benefit and poverty reduction. Such a
system should capitalize on Ghana’s democratic spirit and expertise
in the petroleum industry while guaranteeing that those national
assets are protected by an honest and impartial government. This
system would be best accomplished by drawing on principles from
corporate law accomplishing widespread dispersion of the benefits of
oil production, giving individuals a clear stake in the management of
petroleum resources, providing transparent access to information
needed to ensure proper management of those resources, and then
actually giving interested parties a medium through which to
effectively exact proper management.
Any legal regime that seeks to implement these principles in
Ghana will have to be tailored to certain realities: the economy is
202
largely based on commodity exports, the democratic institutions in
203
place are strong but still fledgling, the government largely lacks the
technocratic expertise and incentives to properly manage large
204
amounts of excess capital, and the GNPC has a great deal of
expertise in managing oil reserves accumulated over decades of
205
operation. Both the political and economic risks of the resource
curse can be mitigated through a system that keeps centralized

202.
203.
204.
205.

See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts I.C.1–2.
See supra note 2.
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management directly accountable to the decentralized stakeholders,
provides those stakeholders economic benefits and incentives to
207
remain engaged in governance and ensure a lack of corruption, and
208
mandates that stakeholders have full access to information. In other
words, Ghana should implement a system that resembles a
corporation.
The Ghanaian government should leave its property rights in
Ghanaian oil in the GNPC and divest itself of all of its shares in the
GNPC, issuing them pro rata to all Ghanaian voters through the
voter-registration channels. The Ghanaian people have a property
interest in the nation’s oil reserves, and this proposed system would
allow them to bear the benefits and responsibilities thereof.
Ghanaians would be entitled to receive the oil revenues through the
dividend vehicle and to vote in elections for directors whose sole job
would be to manage Ghana’s oil. Directors would have disclosure
requirements through a proxy system that would likely be strictly
enforced by a jealous government, which, in turn, would allow the
Ghanaian citizenry, keen on their own financial gain, to demand the
most efficient use of funds. Money would thereby be pulled out of the
oil sector and pumped into the economy writ large, allowing the
Ghanaian people to invest their money in their own interests, which
209
would reduce both poverty and the risk of an enclave oil economy.
Moreover, this would curb the government’s overabundance of
financial resources, incentivize it to manage its oil revenues more
carefully, reduce the risk of corruption, and allow democracy to run
210
properly.
This regime could allow Ghana to reduce the comingling of
politics and monetary gain by disaggregating them: governance (with
politicians and regulators responsible to voters), and resource
exploitation (with directors and managers responsible to citizenshareholders). Because constituents of government and owners of
Ghana’s oil are one and the same, Ghana’s use of a corporation
would likely enhance democratic principles. Thus, the risks of the
206. Cf. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2011) (requiring annual election of corporate
directors).
207. Cf. id. § 170 (authorizing the issuance of corporate dividends to stockholders).
208. Cf. id. § 220(b) (granting shareholders the right to access corporate book and records).
209. See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text (describing the individual benefits of
Alaska’s dividend payout system).
210. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text (noting the positive effects of Alaska’s
dividend-payout system on good governance and democratic accountability).
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resource curse may be overcome by using the corporate form in
tandem with democracy to increase popular control, transparency,
and dispersion of petroleum rents.
Aside from the pragmatic justification that this corporate-law
suggestion could help Ghana avoid the resource curse, there is a
strong justification in the law of property as well. It is relatively
uncontroversial to assert that the people of Ghana (as represented by
their democratically elected government) own the nation’s petroleum
reserves. The warm reception to the Norwegian Minister of the
Environment’s assertion that the people of Ghana, like the people of
Norway, own their country’s petroleum resources makes this
211
abundantly clear. However, it is not necessarily obvious why title to
these publicly owned resources should be vested in the government
apart from the obvious practical reason that the government can
efficiently represent the interests of all these “owners” as a party to a
contract. Property rights, whether vested in an individual, family, or
212
community, tend to be conceptualized in absolute terms, which is
213
often characterized as “dominion” or the possession of “a bundle of
214
legal relations—rights, powers, privileges, immunities.” So if the
people of Ghana own their petroleum resources, why should their
access to their bundle of rights be only tangential, through a
government that has its own interests and might not be best equipped
to manage their petroleum revenues effectively? Issuing shares would
provide a much more efficient and fair means of recognizing the
people’s ownership of Ghana’s petroleum by allowing everyone to
share directly in the financial benefits of production, and by allowing
for targeted voting aimed solely at the management of petroleum
resources without other political considerations, which would make
for more effective exercise of dominion over resources. It has already
been persuasively argued that the international norm of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources vests in peoples, not

211. See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text.
212. See Frank K. Nyame & Joseph Blocher, Influence of Land Tenure Practices on
Artisanal Mining Activity in Ghana, 35 RESOURCES POL’Y 47, 48 (2010) (describing how
customary land holders, such as clan heads, hold absolute title to their lands on behalf of their
people).
213. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development
of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 331 (1980).
214. Arthur L. Corbin, Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YALE L.J. 429, 429
(1922).
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and that the resource curse is combatted by
governments,
216
governments that grant strong individual property rights, so issuing
shares of the GNPC while leaving petroleum rights in the corporation
is justified both under the law of property and as a matter of policy.
That a corporate board of directors is directly elected by
shareholders would likely provide significant benefit to Ghana by
helping to align the interests of managers with those of the people
217
petroleum production is supposed to benefit. This would help to
counteract the risk of the resource curse by giving individuals a stake
in the management of petroleum resources and by giving them a
medium for exacting control. Under the current system, the GNPC is
accountable to the government, which, in a sense, acts as proxy for
218
the Ghanaian people.
However, the government has many
conflicting incentives that produce the common symptoms of the
resource curse, and is thus not optimally equipped to ensure that
219
petroleum management inures to the benefit of the people.
Furthermore, it is logically more difficult for voters to keep
institutions like the GNPC or the government itself accountable
specifically for petroleum management when there are infinitely
many other concerns which might influence voting decisions in
general elections. By disaggregating the elections into votes for
directors and votes for public officials, Ghanaian voters—these new
citizen-shareholders—would not be forced to choose between
candidates who might be best for their petroleum resources and those
who might otherwise be best for the nation. This way, those whose
interests are ultimately at stake would have direct say in the
management of their resources, which would help reduce the
significant agency costs that currently strain this resource-rich

215. Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and People’s Ownership of Natural Resources
in International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 33, 49 (2006).
216. See Karol Boudreaux & Tiernan Mennen, Reverse the Curse: How Can Oil Help the
Poor?, 93 FOREIGN AFF. 182, 183 (2014) (arguing that “strong property rights are critical to
sustainable economic growth” because they empower individuals to live productively).
217. This would likely also entail a financial incentive for serving as a director, so that
candidates would want to seek election by managing the revenues to the citizen-shareholders’
benefit.
218. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., supra notes 49, 91–95 and accompanying text (noting Ghana’s tendency
towards pork-barrel politics and lack of sufficient limitations on spending from petroleum
funds); supra notes 104–08 (recounting the incentives towards maximizing short-term profits
while undermining any positive externalities which might accrue to the people of Ghana).
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220

An additional benefit to the political economy of
economy.
disaggregating voting in this manner would be a reduction in the
importance of resource-related issues in the election of public
officials, a reduction in the corrupting influence of oil, and a
strengthening of Ghana’s status as the brightest shining lodestar in
Africa.
Ghana has the infrastructure to make such a system work. It has
a pool of highly qualified and experienced professionals in the
221
petroleum industry in the GNPC who could serve on the board of
directors. It has a sophisticated voter-registration and polling
222
system, which could be put to good use for registering GNPC
citizen-shareholders and administering votes on directors, helping to
reduce administrative costs and giving Ghana’s people an effective
medium for controlling their petroleum resources. Registering
citizen-shareholders could be accomplished simply by issuing shares
pro rata to all registered voters, which would have the further benefit
of incentivizing voter registration. In addition to voting, corporate
shareholders often keep management accountable by selling their
223
shares, which requires a secondary securities market; in this
particular context, however, such infrastructure is neither necessary
224
nor appropriate. A major purpose of this proposal is to address the
need for wide public participation in the management and benefits of
petroleum resources. Fulfilling this purpose would require restrictions
on transferability to keep the shares from concentrating in the hands
225
of a concentrated group of wealthy buyers in urban centers. Indeed,

220. See supra Part II.
221. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
222. See generally Representation of the People Law, PNDCL 284 (1992) (Ghana),
http://www.ec.gov.gh/pndcl-284 [http://perma.cc/N2UX-J7M4] (detailing statutory procedures
for registering voters and polling votes).
223. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 95 (1985).
224. It is useful here to reaffirm that this proposal does not suggest adopting a mirror image
of a large corporation as might be familiar in the developed world. The circumstances of dealing
with a nation’s petroleum revenue are too unique for that. Rather, this proposal seeks to
employ certain principles of corporate law to craft a solution to this public problem. Hence the
term citizen-shareholder instead of simply shareholder.
225. Some might argue that absent free transferability of shares, the corporate analogy is
not productive because it is so key to how corporations are run; however, it is important to
remember that the formality of the corporate form provides additional benefits, which is why
there are many closely held corporations that restrict alienation of shares. See Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271,
273–74 (1986) (noting the common practice of restraining alienation of shares in close
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this proposal is premised on the assumption that a corporate-law
solution would provide citizen-shareholders an incentive to stay
engaged in the voting process and exact best management of
petroleum revenues.
A sort of proxy system will be necessary to reduce the
administrative costs of voting and to help inform the voters about
226
how the candidates align with citizen-shareholder interests. Two
main principles must be accounted for in such a proxy system in order
to achieve the transparency needed to allow citizen-shareholders to
effectively control their resources: avoiding hegemony of incumbents
and ensuring widespread understanding of the key issues in any
227
election. These principles are necessary to avoid the retrenchment
of leaders indicative of the resource curse and to facilitate the most
efficient control exercised by citizen-shareholders. It would likely be
most efficient and fair to make use of independent organizations like
the PIAC to ensure full disclosure of the relevant issues on a
widespread basis. Basic proxy disclosures provided by the PIAC
228
could be complimented by the many NGOs active in Ghana, in
addition to individual candidates campaigning for election to the
board. By injecting some independent and competing forces in the
proxy-disclosure market, this system would likely help unseat poorly
performing incumbents and to encourage widespread understanding.
Preventing alienation of shares would force disclosure to rural citizenshareholders the same as to urbanites, forcing candidates and
organizations to consider how to overcome the problem of

corporations). Moreover, although concentrated ownership is commonly touted in America and
elsewhere as one way of ensuring better corporate oversight given the incentives of passive
investors to free ride on the efforts of others, these does not seem quite so relevant in this
example where few Ghanaians are likely to have substantial, diversified investment portfolios
and given the civic importance of oil. Transfer restrictions are well known as a matter of
contract, id., and securities regulation, see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (2015) (requiring that
unregistered securities issued under Regulation D in the United States must include transfer
restrictions). Using either method would likely be easy to implement in Ghana considering that
the each share would be bound up with voter registration. See supra note 222 and accompanying
text.
226. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L.
& ECON. 395, 399–408 (1983) (arguing that voting and proxy systems are an integral part of the
contracting that forms a corporation as shareholders seek to manage the agency costs associated
with electing others to manage their assets).
227. The above comparative study implies a need for a countervailing force to restrain
petroleum-revenue managers and for transparency in order to combat the resource curse. See
supra Part II.
228. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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widespread illiteracy in Ghana. However it is ultimately structured,
such a proxy system would help to provide the transparency needed
to allow citizen-shareholders to hold management accountable to the
best and most socially responsible use of petroleum resources and
revenues.
The final component of this system is mandatory dividend
distribution, which would help spread the benefits of petroleum
widely throughout Ghana to avoid concentration of wealth and
enclave economies, and to provide citizen-shareholders an incentive
to exact good governance of petroleum revenues. Under this
proposal, the GNPC board would be required to issue an annual
dividend to its citizen-shareholders when its cash holdings surpassed a
certain threshold. Payment of oil revenues directly to citizens is often
seen as an important tool for combating the resource curse, and
scholars have advocated direct cash contributions to the Ghanaian
230
citizenry. This is important because it takes the money out of the
hands of the government, which may be corrupted by it, and instead
puts it in the hands of ordinary citizens, on whose lives it would have
231
a direct impact. Pulling money out of the oil sector and putting it in
the pockets of all Ghanaians reduces the risk of an enclave oil
economy by enabling the people to spend or invest their money in
whatever sector they choose. Moreover, adding a mandatory dividend
to this corporate law proposal can further help to combat the
resource curse by giving citizen-shareholders an incentive to vote and
to ensure best management of petroleum resources—part of their
livelihood depends upon it. When coupled with the robust, targeted
governance system of the corporate form, the dividend should
provide a highly effective means of curtailing the resource curse in
Ghana, where democratic institutions are still growing.
There remains the issue of whether the Ghanaian government
would actually accept such a proposal in which it cedes a major

229. Cf. Ghana Factbook, supra note 45 (noting a 76.6 percent literacy rate for Ghana). This
is of course not to say that Ghana should legally mandate that shareholders be literate. Rather,
it is simply an observation that literacy is necessary in order for disclosure and governance to be
meaningful. Thus, this system could provide a structural inventive for overcoming illiteracy, or,
at the very least, for finding effective means of transmitting information to the illiterate.
230. See, e.g., Moss & Young, supra note 12, at 13 (recommending that Ghana adopt an
Alaskan-style trust to pay dividends directly to citizens from oil extraction). Moss and Young
suggest that this might be accomplished in several ways, including through a biometricidentification system, which is already within the Bank of Ghana’s capability. Id. at 18–19.
231. Id. at 15–18.
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232

portion of its revenue and power to another institution. Although
this may seem farfetched, Ghanaian leaders interested in good
governance might be motivated by compelling policy rationales. First,
it is important to note that the government would not be giving up
sovereignty. By relinquishing its GNPC shares and leaving the
corporation property rights in the nation’s oil reserves, the
government would give up ownership, not the right to regulate or tax.
This is key because, with tax revenues on the line, the Ghanaian
government would have an incentive to regulate the industry
effectively and sustainably. Given the existence of a rival institution,
the government would have an interest in exercising its sovereignty
by jealously enforcing the proposed voting, proxy, and dividend rules;
233
instituting a regulatory regime for oil extraction; and ensuring full
234
tax collection. The government would still retain large petroleum
235
revenues through corporate taxes and would gain another large
portion via personal income taxes, allowing it to build its taxation
capacity. This would also reduce risks that Ghana might not be able
236
to absorb excess capital or to get returns on its oil funds. This
regime would prove more beneficial to the government and people of
Ghana alike by encouraging optimal utilization of oil revenues and by
aligning incentives for sustainable democratic and economic growth
through a regulated petroleum industry that is clearly separate from
the government.
Therefore, in order to avoid the risks of the resource curse,
Ghana should adopt the above corporate-law solution based in the
ideal of the citizen-shareholder. This regime would eschew the risks
of the resource curse by reducing the overall reliance on commodity
232. The Ghanaian government might choose a middle-ground approach by issuing shares
to its citizens, while retaining a stake in the company. This might be more palatable as it would
still hold direct influence over the GNPC and have access to more petroleum revenues;
however, this is not ideal, as it undermines the benefits of separating governance from
petroleum production.
233. Ghana has not instituted a regulatory regime independent from the government’s
production interest. See supra notes 2, 9 and accompanying text. However, it is likely important
to a sustainable petroleum economy, as seen in Norway. See supra note 147 and accompanying
text.
234. One of the major symptoms of the resource curse is the tendency of resource-rich
governments to put less effort into tax collection and other more sustainable sources of income
in favor of relying on resource rents. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
235. For example, in 2013, 25.63 percent of all government petroleum revenues came from
corporate income tax on the private participants in the petroleum industry. 2013 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 11, at 21.
236. See supra Figures 1–3.
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exports and the risk of corruption and facilitating economic and
democratic development by aligning the incentives of those in charge
of petroleum with those of the people. Ghana has the infrastructure
needed to make this work, and the introduction of a strong
institutional rival to the government would incentivize better
regulation and taxation of petroleum revenues while building on the
democratic institutions that have made Ghana the envy of Africa.
CONCLUSION
The jubilation attending Ghana’s discovery of large oil reserves
has overshadowed the risk that the nation might succumb to the
resource curse, and, to some extent, this is rightfully so. Ghana is one
of the world’s most promising democracies and has put in place a
system for managing its petroleum revenues. Much can and should be
made of Ghana’s promise and capabilities, and this is precisely why
Ghana needs a legal regime for managing petroleum revenues that is
tailored to its strengths, but is also keenly aware that Ghana is still a
young democracy with serious poverty problems and an economy
rendered fragile by its reliance on commodity exports. The right
system is needed to ensure that Ghana is able to fulfill its promise as a
prosperous and stable democracy.
Sadly, the current system falls short in this regard and leaves
Ghana exposed to the curse. This Note proposes a solution by
drawing on principles of corporate law. This proposal, based on the
ideal of the citizen-shareholder, draws on the efficiencies and
incentives of the corporate form to foster sustained economic and
democratic growth. By separating the government from direct
participation in petroleum production and by giving the public a
direct stake therein, Ghana can avoid the resource curse and remain a
model for African democracy.

